from Africa Today Volume 46, Number 1The Dynamic Nature of Citizenship and Participation: Lessons from Three Rural Senegalese Case Studies
Amy S. Patterson
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This article uses three case studies from rural Senegalese communal organizations to examine the dynamic nature of citizenship and participation. Citizenship reflects a set of expectations about rights and responsibilities that a particular community and its members have for one another. The work illustrates two conditions under which those expectations can change. First, when the community does not incorporate inclusive decision-making institutions that value the involvement of all participants, individuals may question their citizenship rights and exit the community. Second, when the community cannot live up to the material expectations that members have for it, people may question why they must responsibly give time, energy, or resources to the community. The article demonstrates how state actors, macroeconomic forces, and power relations shape the nature of decision-making processes and the ability of the community to meet its social contract.
This paper seeks to examine citizenship and participation in Senegal.1 In recent years, the citizenship framework has been used to explain ethnic-based participation in democratic transitions (Ndegwa 1997), the nature of ideological debates during the apartheid struggle in South Africa (Halisi 1997), and the marginal position of ethnic groups in West Africa (Konneh 1996). Citizenship defines the members (and, implicitly, non-members) of a common society (Barbalet 1988: 1). It directly addresses the rights and obligations involved in the relationship between individuals and the community and the ways that relationship impacts political participation. Citizenship reflects a set of expectations that the community and its members have for one another.
This article seeks to empirically test the dynamic nature of citizenship and to examine the factors that can transform how individuals see their rights and obligations in a community. I use research from subnational communities--two case studies from rural Senegalese organizations and one case study from Senegal's national Muslim community. In doing so, I take membership in local associations as an indicator of community membership. While the three cases are different in scope (local versus national), they all illustrate the ways that citizenship and participation can change. Though many aspects of the three cases are not unique to Senegal, my findings are not intended to be generalized to other regions. Rather, the three well-documented cases provide a starting point for critically evaluating the dynamic nature of citizenship.
Because participation reflects the ways that individuals view their rights and responsibilities in a society, it is closely linked to citizenship. Participation is all activities (local and national) that are intended to influence public decision making and the allocation of resources (Chazan 1982).2 Participation includes voting, lobbying, and activities at the local level. Involvement in women's groups or village organizations, for example, can shape decisions that distribute resources, whether those are development funds or patronage (Hirshmann 1991).
Theoretical Understandings of Citizenship and Participation
This work builds on the scholarship of Stephen Ndegwa (1997), who uses the Kenyan case to illustrate that citizenship can be understood from both liberal and communal (civic-republican) perspectives. Liberal views of citizenship concentrate on the rights of the individual in the common society. The notion of liberal citizenship captures the idea that people view themselves as part of a larger political entity, which grants them equal access to political, social, and civil rights. These individuals express their citizenship through participatory acts that enhance their rights (Marshall 1964: 78). Communal interpretations of citizenship focus on an individual's responsibility to the society (Miller 1995). This viewpoint argues that citizens see themselves as part of a shared community (Stewart 1995), which may not be rooted in the nation-state but in subnational ascriptive or non-ascriptive identities (Turner 1993: 12-15). The communal interpretation maintains that individuals participate because they feel a responsibility to the society and want it to achieve common goals (Oldeld 1990). In this article, I assume that citizenship has both liberal and communal attributes.I also maintain that perceptions of citizenship rights and responsibilities are dynamic. This work illustrates that citizenship may change because of the ways that decisions are made within a community. David Miller (1995) asserts that if political decision making is inclusive, incorporates compromise and consensus building, and values the ideas of all participants, individuals may feel that their rights as members of the community have been acknowledged, and they may continue to meet their obligations to the common society. On the other hand, power inequalities in society and institutional structures may constrain discourse and political involvement. Political institutions may be designed in such a way that they exclude the involvement of most individuals (Knight 1992: 19), while decisions made through public discussion may simply equal the ideas and desires of those who dominate society (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). I argue that these exclusive decision-making institutions may cause people to redefine their relationship with the community, and possibly to renege on their obligations. The cases below illustrate how institutional arrangements that involve state actors are one cause of inequality in decision making. State policies and the ties local elites have to state officials can transform the community context and the ways rights and obligations are viewed within that context.
The rights and responsibilities that people feel in a community may also be transformed when the community cannot meet its material obligations to its members. In The Politics, Aristotle defines the citizen as an individual who is responsible to the community and carries out a duty to work toward the common good of the society (Aristotle 1982: 107-108). But it is not only that people are obligated to participate for the sake of the common society; society is also expected to give something back to individuals. People gain a sense of belonging when they meet their obligations to society (Rousseau 1968: 59-64), but more importantly, they often receive material benefits from the community (Oldeld 1990). There is a social contract which allows individuals to rely on each other to achieve shared goals, to have confidence that their contributions will be reciprocated and that they will have the right to access benefits (Ndegwa 1997; Hyden 1980: 18-19). The social contract and the right to rewards for all participants encourage individuals to meet their obligations in the community.
This article illustrates that the social contract may weaken if the community cannot provide the benefits that its members want, or if some individuals are refused the right to access group resources. People may question their responsibilities in a community that can no longer provide for them, or denies them the rewards of participation. There are numerous causes for such changes, but the findings below illustrate that macroeconomic stresses and institutional arrangements that promote unequal decision making particularly affect the ability of the community to meet its obligations to citizens. These forces may be external to the community, yet they may cause individuals to re-evaluate their responsibility to the common society.
The following empirical studies enhance our understanding of citizenship by illustrating the dynamic nature of rights and responsibilities in three particular communities. The cases demonstrate, first, that the power relations and institutional structures of decision making can negate citizen obligations, and, second, that an ever-evolving social contract can shape individual views of citizenship. The first two cases demonstrate both of these aspects of citizenship and participation. The cases are from the local organizations of the water pump (forage) committee and the women's promotion group (groupement de promotion féminine--GPF) in the village of Ndoulo (population 1,700). Data comes from interviews with Ndoulo residents and group members, as well as observations of decision-making processes in these associations.
The third case expands the scope of study beyond the village level to examine Senegal's Mouride Islamic organization (tariqa).3 I use the secondary literature on the Mourides to illustrate the dynamic nature of citizenship in the tariqa. To shed further light on this issue, I utilize interviews with Mourides in Patar, a community of 600. Because of the constraints of data, the third case does not examine how decision-making institutions among the Mourides influence citizenship. Rather, it focuses on how the nature of citizen rights and responsibilities implied by the social contract changes over time. All interviews and observations used in this work were conducted in 1994 and 1995.4
Both Ndoulo and Patar are located in the Diourbel region, which is a primary area for cultivation of Senegal's main cash crop, peanuts. Both villages are located on a national highway, which gives inhabitants some access to urban areas, and both have been somewhat incorporated into the capitalist economy through cash crop production, urban migration, and weekly markets. The responses and situations outlined in this work provide an in-depth examination of the nature of citizen rights and responsibilities in two rural Senegalese communities.
Case #1: The Ndoulo Community Forage and Forage Committee
The first case study illustrates how power inequalities in society shape decision making and structural factors, which affects the ability of the community to uphold its end of the social contract and may lead to transformations in individuals' ideas about obligations to the common society. The Ndoulo forage is a diesel-powered pump and series of pipelines and faucets that provide water to the village. Since wells in Ndoulo are in disrepair, the forage serves as the only village water source. Every two years, Ndoulo residents elect a committee of twelve individuals to manage the forage. The committee collects monthly water fees from Ndoulo inhabitants, pays expenses for labor and fuel, balances the monthly accounts, and meets biannually with villagers to report on the status of the forage. Villagers may also attend and participate in monthly forage committee meetings.The Ndoulo forage shows how decision-making processes that ignore community members' rights to participate may cause individuals to re-evaluate their obligations to communal groups. Exclusive decision making is often rooted in power inequalities in society. In Ndoulo, the highest status villagers served on the forage committee--the village chief, his wife, his nephew, four Ndoulo merchants, one large landowner, two school teachers, and two village elders. Many villagers depended on these wealthy committee members, whose patronage helped residents to survive during difficult times. They loaned farmers peanut seeds for cultivation or food during the hungry season, and they gave the largest donations at funerals and baptisms (Male villager, 5 March 1995; Female villager, 14 February 1995). Though class consciousness and class organization are generally underdeveloped in Senegal (Fatton 1988),5 poor Ndoulo residents were intensely aware of income differences between themselves and the committee members. One man said, "There are five or six families in Ndoulo [all of whom serve on the forage committee] which have everything--a big house, a television, electricity--while the rest of us cannot afford food for three meals a day" (Male villager, 21 June 1995).
The high status of the committee members and their role as village patrons were key reasons for their election. Social norms in rural Senegal stipulate that village elites hold positions of power (Male villager, 17 February 1995). Yet, as one woman explained, there was a social contract between the committee members and the residents; the committee had an obligation to adequately manage the water resources, and the villagers had an obligation to adhere to the decisions the committee made. Until recently, residents felt committee members had met their responsibilities, and villagers had re-elected them repeatedly since the mid-1980s (Female villager, 30 January 1995).
In some cases, state actors may also cause inequalities in communal decision making. Outside agents--and the resources they bring to the community and its members--can shape how individuals view their obligation to the social contract. This was true of the Ndoulo forage committee, in which members had ties to state officials.6 State officials and committee members provided one another with assistance and political support (Male villager, 18 March 1995; Gyimah-Boadi 1994), and committee members often worked closely with state officials to get forage parts or technical assistance. The majority of committee members were also involved in the ruling Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste--PS), and the Ndoulo arrondissement PS leader served on the committee. These alignments strengthened the committee's power because villagers did not want to isolate themselves from state or party resources.
A meeting held in Ndoulo in March 1995 provides an example of how power inequalities and the involvement of external factors may influence decision-making processes and cause people to re-assess their communal obligations.7 To better contextualize the meeting, it is necessary to provide some background information on the condition of the forage. Between March 1994 and August 1995, the forage faced several problems. Fuel prices had increased because of Senegal's 50 percent devaluation of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) currency in February 1994, and this fact made it difficult to balance the monthly accounts. The forage had broken down several times, and replacement parts (which were imported) had become more expensive (Male forage committee member, 29 January 1995). During February 1995, the forage did not function for eighteen days because the committee did not have enough money to buy needed fuel. The dire situation made Ndoulo residents angry with the committee and its management of the forage (Female villager, 14 February 1995; Male villager, 19 February, 1995).
One month after the forage broke down, the Ndoulo forage committee proposed an increase in the amount residents paid monthly for water in order to overcome some of these financial problems. Distrustful of the committee, Ndoulo inhabitants who came to the March 1995 meeting hoped to elect a new committee, since the officers had almost completed their two-year term (Male forage committee member, 13 March 1995; Male villager, 18 March 1995; Male villager, 31 March 1995). The sous-préfet, who was not a member of the committee and did not attend monthly committee meetings, moderated the meeting and set the agenda. The chef du CER and an official from the Diourbel Water Department also attended. These officials explained the budgetary problems of the forage, and on behalf of the committee, proposed an increase in the rate of payments. Their support for the price increase made it apparent that there would be no opportunity to bring up other issues at the meeting. Villagers could not propose that a new committee be elected, since the suggestion would have countered the authority of these officials. One interviewee pointed out that because the sous-préfet, chef du CER, and the Water Department official allocate resources to villagers and make crucial decisions, no one wanted to challenge them (Male villager, 18 March 1995).
After three hours of debate, the state officials went to the sous-préfet's office for lunch. A younger man from a poorer family, which had been somewhat ostracized in Ndoulo because of its members' outspokenness, then raised the issue that many villagers wanted to discuss--election of a new committee. A small contingent of young, educated men used this opportunity to argue in favor of the proposal, though, for the most part, the committee ignored them. In an apparent attempt to stall for time, committee members took turns standing on their chairs to speak in favor of raising the price of dues. Although those in the audience tried to speak in favor of elections, many of their most vocal advocates had left the meeting earlier when they realized the committee and state officials would control the agenda. The decision-making process ignored the rights of villagers to contribute their ideas.
When the state officials returned, they promptly announced that there would be no elections for a new committee. They did not take time to consider the reasons to hold elections, though they were probably aware of the widespread distrust of the committee. Instead, the officials and the committee suggested that everyone agree to form a redressment committee to oversee the work of the regular committee, audit financial records, and suggest what, if any, price increase was appropriate. Since those who wanted to hold elections had been ignored and were powerless to challenge the officials, they had little choice but to agree with the proposal.8 They suggested the names of two younger, educated men and one educated woman to be on the redressment committee. The committee rejected the woman, chose an older man (who was a relative of one of the committee members), and adjourned the meeting.9
Community patrons and state officials ignored the rights of members of the community to participate in dialogue and decision making. One villager talked about how, because of power inequalities in the village, those of little status acquiesced to the decision, even though their right to be a part of that decision had been dismissed. Most people felt they could not contradict the decisions of village patrons and state officials (Female villager, 26 May 1995). One man replied after the meeting, "The sous-préfet and guy from the Water Department protected the committee, instead of letting us elect a new committee. The decision was not one that all agreed with, but what could we do? Argue with the sous-préfet?" (Male villager, 18 March 1995). This statement shows that villagers felt they should have had a role in group decisions. The forage situation presents a crucial lesson. State administrators, who are not elected by community members and are not obligated to the community's social contract, may ignore the rights and responsibilities of individuals.
In one sense, the redressment committee was a compromise and could have provided dissatisfied Ndoulo villagers a means by which to oversee the committee and be represented in decision making. The committee could have been a means to recognize the rights and responsibilities of individuals. However, the redressment committee was not allowed to play its intended role.10 In subsequent monthly meetings of the redressment and forage committees (which government officials did not attend), the forage committee controlled the agenda, did not let the redressment committee members speak or have access to the financial records of the forage, and ignored their questions about the forage spending patterns (Female forage committee member, 6 June 1995; Male villager, 6 May 1995). After two of the three redressment committee members missed meetings in April and May because they were not informed about them, they said their right to represent the other villagers was not being taken seriously by the committee (Male redressment committee member, 20 May 1995).
The villagers had little recourse when it became apparent that the redressment committee could not play its watchdog role. While some residents complained to committee members, most knew that if they wanted changes, they would have to win the support of state officials. However, it appeared that most villagers would not risk telling the sous-préfet or chef du CER that the redressment committee was not working, since villagers did not want the officials to think they were trouble-makers (Male redressment committee member, 6 May 1995). Because of power imbalances in the decision-making processes of this group, and because of the involvement of state officials in this association, the rights of individuals to participate were ignored. Individuals then questioned their obligations to the community. Many villagers began to disengage from the social contract and quit attending meetings. Only 100 of the estimated 600 Ndoulo adult inhabitants attended the March 1995 meeting, and most of these individuals were men.11 The Ndoulo forage situation illustrates that when the rights of individuals are disregarded, those individuals may begin to question their responsibilities to the common society.
Another reason people may re-assess their obligations to a society is if they no longer feel they benefit from its social contract. Such a change occurred in Ndoulo. From the mid-1980s when it was built until 1994, the forage had functioned smoothly. It rarely broke down, and people gave their monthly payments (Male villager, 31 January 1995; Female villager, 23 March 1995). By 1994, things had changed. Water shortages happened often and the committee had increased the price three times between February 1994 and January 1995 (Male forage committee member, 29 January 1995).12 Since the public good of water was less certain, people questioned why they needed to responsibly participate. One man said, "People in Ndoulo don't come to meetings or pay their dues because they are upset and disgusted with the forage. Since it often does not work, they figure, 'Why bother?'" (Male villager, 18 May 1995) Almost sixty households did not pay their monthly dues, which amounted to approximately 20 percent of the money needed to run the forage (Male forage committee member, 18 May 1995). While it may have been purposeful and political, villagers' nonparticipation (in the form of nonpayment) was not in the interest of the village as a whole. Indeed, the financial problems of the forage were exacerbated because so many people did not pay.
The forage case provides one illustration of how individuals may react when they feel the community has ignored their rights to participate and refused to meet its material obligations to its members. In some cases, and particularly this one, citizens may question their responsibilities to the community. They may refuse to uphold their end of the social contract if they perceive that the community is not upholding its end. They may do this in spite of the fact that their participation would benefit the larger group.
The Ndoulo forage shows how external variables beyond the control of a community may influence ideas about rights to participate and responsibilities to meet obligations. While not always the case, these factors may transform reciprocal communal obligations and the social contract. In the forage, the elite decision makers who ignored people's opinions made individuals feel that they had no right to be a part of the process. The reason these decision-making institutions were exclusive, though, was because of the involvement of state officials. Though state officials did not make decisions about the forage, their implicit support for committee members meant that individuals would not aggressively challenge the committee. Villagers might privately complain to committee members, or those of higher education levels might ask questions at meetings, but most Ndoulo residents did nothing. The overall institutional nature of the committee and its cooptation by the state made participation more difficult and helped to corrode the social contract within the community.
However, the exclusive decision-making processes in the group were not new. It was just that before 1994 the villagers had been more willing to ignore them, because residents were still getting water. While elitist, the committee had a certain level of legitimacy as long as it was effective. It was only after a structural change--the 1994 devaluation of the CFA currency--made it more difficult for the committee to provide water (and for villagers to pay for it) that people began to question their responsibilities to a community that could not meet its obligations. Even though devaluation was beyond the control of the committee, and even though some villagers did not really understand why devaluation put such a financial strain on the forage (Male forage committee member, 6 May 1995), this economic change caused residents to re-examine their responsibilities to a committee that was not fulfilling its obligations. Devaluation highlighted problems of decision making and participation which had previously been ignored, and contributed to the transformation of the social contract in Ndoulo. In this case, institutional and macroeconomic factors outside the realm of the community affected how individuals saw their rights and responsibilities inside the community.
Case #2: The Ndoulo GPF
The case of the Ndoulo GPF provides another example of how the ways that people view their rights and responsibilities in a community may change. The Ndoulo GPF is a group of eighty women of different ages, class levels, and traditional status backgrounds. The group formed in the late 1970s, and a decade later it paid 22,000 CFA to gain official state recognition as a GPF (GPF president, 7 December 1994).13 GPF status enables women's associations to obtain bank loans, to be eligible for development projects sponsored by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and to have access to assistance from state officials (Monitrice, 19 March 1995).14 While not all women's groups in Senegal have registered with the state because of the expense and their suspicion of state officials, the number of GPFs in rural areas has risen dramatically since 1985 (Niang 1991).Rural women in Senegal depend greatly on women's organizations such as the Ndoulo GPF. Because of the decline of agricultural productivity in Senegal's peanut-producing areas (Lewis 1987: 291-300), male heads of households earn only enough money through agriculture to feed their families for half of the year (Male villager, 1 March 1995). Men often migrate to urban areas, leaving their wives in an uncertain financial situation. To supplement transfer payments from their husbands, women rely on mutual support networks and income-generating opportunities (Female villager, 4 February 1995). Women's associations help their members obtain credit, gain literacy or numeracy skills, share workloads, and overcome other constraints that hinder women's involvement in the economy (Patterson 1996: 193-225; Teague 1991; Nelson 1981).
Ideally, women's associations can build on women's solidarity and experiences to help them achieve shared goals (Mwaniki 1986). But common experiences do not necessarily mean that people will feel shared responsibilities to participate for larger goods. I argue that if decision-making processes do not reflect the rights of individuals to participate in discussion and compromise, people may question their obligations to the community. Such was the case in the Ndoulo GPF, in which power imbalances that developed after the group became a GPF changed the nature of decision making. In early 1990, the Ndoulo GPF president was elected to be the president of the Diourbel département women's federation, which consists of more than 200 village-level GPFs.15 This position enabled her to interact regularly with party politicians and the sous-préfet, monitrice, and chef du CER, and to have access to state patronage and political support. State officials helped the president maintain power by refusing to let the members elect a new president or form another GPF (GPF member, 10 December 1994).16
The exclusive decision-making processes of the group were reflected in the fact that the GPF rarely had meetings (GPF member, 23 March 1995). The treasurer explained that the president and state officials often made decisions without any input from members, and sometimes without the advice of other GPF officers (GPF treasurer, 25 March 1995). In the one meeting the group held while this research was conducted, the leaders ignored the rights of participants to be involved in decision making. 17 On 19 May 1995, GPF members met with an official of the World Bank, the sous-préfet, and the monitrice to discuss a new World Bank program to encourage girls' education. In order to get project funding, the Ndoulo village women needed to sign up at least twenty girls to begin school in Fall 1995. The agenda of the meeting was not to discuss or debate the program, but to instruct the women to collect as many names of eligible girls as they could. The president and government officials presented the ideas, told the women the deadline for the project, and then adjourned the meeting.
While it was highly probable that GPF members did not oppose the project that the president and officials proposed, the larger issue is that the meeting was not a free forum for discussion of different points of view. The president and state officials controlled the agenda and provided no opportunities for questions; the president did not take advantage of the opportunity to discuss any other projects in which the GPF was involved (GPF member, 22 May 1995; GPF member, 26 May 1995). One member pointed out that the women did not feel they could speak against the program because they did not want to challenge the authority of the sous-préfet and monitrice, on whom they may depend for future favorable treatment (GPF member, 22 May 1995). Three interviewees said the women felt they had little recourse against the president because of her support from state officials (GPF member, 22 May 1995; GPF member, 19 December 1994; GPF member, 26 March 1995).
The women reacted to the inequality in decision making by re-evaluating their obligations to the group. One woman pointed out that she did not see the use in attending meetings anymore, since the president would just make all the decisions; what the women said really did not matter (GPF member, 10 December 1994). Another member said that because the GPF rarely had meetings, she did not feel any responsibilities to the group (GPF member, 23 March 1995). The attitudes of these women provide an example of how individuals whose rights to participate are ignored may begin to question their role in the community.
It may also be the case that when a community cannot (or will not) meet its obligations to the social contract, its members may be likely to refuse to meet their obligations. In the case of the forage, we saw that the community could not meet its obligations because of the financial problems that followed the devaluation of the CFA currency; structural factors constrained the association. This was not the case in the Ndoulo GPF. Rather, the president had gradually denied women's access to group benefits. In previous years, the women had shared the rewards of the group; by 1995, the situation had changed.
In the association's first fifteen years, the women had successfully completed many projects (GPF president, 7 December 1994; GPF member, 19 December 1994). For example, ten years earlier, the members planted, watered, and protected a woodlot of tree seedlings. After five years, the trees were large enough to harvest and were sold for a profit. Part of the money was reinvested into a millet seed storage program, through which the GPF bought seeds at a low price at harvest time, stored them, and resold them for a higher price before the planting season. The rest of the profits from the harvest were given to GPF members. While the amount was only 1,500 CFA per individual, the money did allow some women to pay for needed food or purchase items to be sold in the market (GPF member, 20 March 1995; GPF member, 26 May 1995).18
Things began to change, though, as the president built ties to state officials. Two statements from interviewees illustrate how the community gradually denied the rights of individuals to access its resources. One woman said, "The government of America brought the GPF sewing machines, scissors, cloth, and supplies and the monitrice began to teach us how to be tailors. Soon, though, the supplies disappeared and the project ended. The president took everything and sold it and she and the monitrice kept the money. We got nothing out of it--even though it was supposed to be for all of us" (GPF member, 26 May 1995).
Another member explained the transformation of the group,
When we started this group, everyone was the same. The president was just one of us and we trusted her. We all had similar problems, and the group was intended to help everyone out. We wanted projects to bring money, a group that could offer loans, a network of support for baptisms and funerals. But things changed. Over time, [the president] built a new house of concrete, got a television, electricity, and even a water faucet extension to her compound. She put on her nice clothing, her fancy shoes, her jewelry of gold, and she acted like she was better than us. All the while, it appeared that the group's money was decreasing. All the money from our peanut field, our cattle project, our dues. . . . When we told the chef du CER, he said that we were just jealous of her husband's good fortunes in business (GPF member, 16 February 1995).While these rumors of corruption were impossible to verify, the truthfulness of these allegations is less important than the fact that most members believed them to be true. The perception among members of corruption made many women question why they should contribute to the group, if they were not gaining anything from it (GPF member, 29 March 1995; GPF member, 10 December 1994). Their right to access benefits, as well as to participate in group decisions, was gone. The statements by interviewees indicate that the expectations that citizens have of one another may change because of new opportunities that some individuals in the community have. Ties to state officials may be one way that some individuals gain those opportunities for external resources and support.
The GPF provides an illustration of how the mutability of a community's social contract may cause individuals to re-evaluate their obligations to that community. Most women in the GPF chose not to be involved in the group. Of the eighty members, only fifteen attended the May 1995 meeting. Most GPF members also did not help on group projects. For example, the GPF planted a peanut field in 1994 to make money, but less than ten women helped with the harvest (Monitrice, 19 March 1995; GPF president, Ndoulo, 12 March 1995). One member concluded, "Since I get nothing from the group, why would I stay in the GPF?" (GPF member, 12 December 1994).
While nonparticipation was a deliberate act by most GPF members, it was not organized to achieve a collective good. Abstention such as that by GPF members may express individuals' disgust with their community and the changed nature of obligations within it, but it cannot easily enable individuals to build new communities that value their input and have new definitions of social obligations. In the GPF, abstention did not enable the women to challenge the president or, more importantly, to start effective associations (other than GPFs) to achieve communal goals.
Communal obligations built on gender solidarity had changed in the GPF. Unlike the case of the forage, it was not that macroeconomic forces had transformed the members' loyalties and involvement in the GPF. Rather, institutional factors that reflected the overall nature of GPF arrangements in Senegal had affected the social contract. Because the GPF was affiliated with the state, group members gradually lost control of the organization and its benefits. As the president slowly gained closer ties to state actors, she no longer needed to pay attention to the input of the members or to share group benefits with them. By 1995, members questioned their responsibility to a community which once had valued their opinions, shared group resources with them, and helped them to achieve needed public goods, but which now ignored their involvement and could not meet their expectations. The GPF provides evidence that state influences, which are outside the control of community members, may shape how individuals view their rights in the community and their obligations to the social contract.
Case #3: Mouride Religious Adherents in Senegal (and Patar)
The above cases provide illustrations of how transformations of the social contract may affect how individuals define their rights and obligations in local settings. This section builds on previous scholarship about Senegal's Mouride religious community and interviews with Patar Mourides to shed further light on this issue.19 While this case study moves beyond a local-level analysis, it continues the earlier investigation of the ways that citizens' views of community rights and responsibilities may change. I illustrate that in the last decade many Mourides have quit viewing their vote choice in national elections as an obligatory act by which the religious community and its leaders can obtain public goods. This change in perception and participation is rooted in the decline of material reciprocity between the state and the Mouride community. To understand this transformation, and the structural factors that have led to it, it is necessary to first examine Mouridism in Senegal.Mouridism is based on the life and experiences of its founder, Shaykh Amadou Bamba Mbacké (1850-1927). Amadou Bamba was an ascetic man who exhorted his followers to pray, fast, seek instruction, devote themselves to a religious leader (marabout),20 and work for the marabout (Cruise O'Brien 1970; Cruise O'Brien 1971). Mouridism gained supporters as the French colonialists attacked indigenous Wolof ethnic society in the late 1800s. To encourage peanut cultivation, the French gave the marabouts large tracts of land and economic resources, which the religious leaders shared with their disciples in return for labor and devotion (Coulon 1976; Cruise O'Brien 1970: 160-162; Cruise O'Brien 1971: 163-187; Klein 1968: 221-229; Trimingham 1962: 177). Because of this clientelist relationship, Mouride leaders have been criticized for exploiting their followers and controlling their disciples' actions (Cruise O'Brien 1979: 215; Fatton 1986; Markovitz 1970).
Senegalese politicians have often relied on the marabouts to deliver the votes of their followers. Since pre-independence elections, the marabouts have mobilized rural peasants through commands (ndigals), which are given over the radio or in person; the most prominent and influential of these ndigals come from the xalifa-general. A reciprocal understanding appeared to exist between the Mourides and Senegal's first president Léopold Sédar Senghor of the PS.21 Senghor instituted rural development programs to bolster peanut production, implemented favorable peanut prices, and provided the marabouts and their followers with free farming implements (Creevey 1985; Morgenthau 1964: 149). There was an implicit social contract between the Mouride community and the state--the state provided benefits to these religious leaders and their rural followers and, in return, the Mourides supported the state (Coulon and Cruise O'Brien 1989: 149-150). For Mouride community members, a vote for the PS was a vote for a larger public good and reflected one's obligation to the religious group. Mouride citizens felt a responsibility to participate in order to benefit the community, had a right to access group benefits, and received rewards for their involvement.
It is essential to emphasize, though, that Mouride disciples have never unconditionally followed their marabouts, despite their close relations with the holy men (Behrman 1970: 61).22 The relationship has always been conditional on the community's ability to meet its obligations to its members. Leonardo Villalón (1995: 121) writes, "There is no denying that, taken as a whole, marabouts in Senegal exert a great deal of influence over their followers. . . . Yet the extent of that influence varies significantly from one context to another and indeed, from one individual to another." Donal B. Cruise O'Brien (1971: 5) further explains that the willingness of disciples to uphold their end of the social contract (and follow ndigals) is related to the ability of the religious community (and its leaders) to meet its obligation of access to state resources. "They [followers] may seek spiritual comfort in the assurance of salvation [from the marabout], and a sense of identity in the Mouride community, but they also demand material security and political protection from the organization to which they give so complete an allegiance."
On the aggregate, Mourides are probably more willing than not to consider the opinions of their marabouts, but this level of influence depends on how well the social contract between the members and the community is met. In the last decade, macroeconomic forces have made it more difficult for the marabouts to guarantee that the political participation of their followers will lead to communal goods. After a period of drought in the 1970s contributed to a 50 percent decrease in Senegal's peanut exports and an increase in the country's international debt, Senegal was forced in 1980 to institute structural adjustment policies (SAPs). Adjustments have included cuts in spending on health care and education, an end to subsidies for fertilizers, seeds, and agricultural credit, and privatization of the trade and marketing of peanuts (Ka and van de Walle 1992). Because of these SAPs, the state has been unable to guarantee the same level of patronage to the marabouts and their followers.23 This situation illustrates that the resources on which the social contract in a community is built may be outside the control of the community; external factors may influence how well the common society can meet its obligations.
The decline of national policies that benefited the Mouride rural community has damaged the social contract. It is not that members' rights to access group resources have been dismissed (as was the case in the Ndoulo GPF), but that resources themselves have drastically decreased. In fact, rural Mourides determined that their votes for the PS no longer would lead to public goods for the community long before their marabouts did. By 1988, many voters had realized that the state could not meet their expectations and provide the same level of patronage as it had in the past. During the contentious presidential campaign of 1988 between President Abdou Diouf of the PS and Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti Démocratique Sénégalais--PDS), the Mouride xalifa-general issued an ndigal to vote for President Diouf. Cruise O'Brien explains that the PDS slogan of sopi (change) captivated many voters throughout Senegal. Without any formal organizing, Mouride voters began to gradually define ndigals in two ways--the ndigal of politics which could be ignored and the ndigal of religion which should be followed. This fact shows how under some conditions individuals may begin to re-interpret their responsibilities to a community in light of changed material conditions. By 1993, Mouride national leaders realized that to maintain the allegiance of their followers, they should not make a public statement in support of the PS in the presidential election (Cruise O'Brien 1993).
In the case of the Mourides, the benefits of the social contract did not fully disappear before people began to re-evaluate their obligations. It may be that in some circumstances only a relative, not absolute, decline in communal resources may influence how individuals see their responsibilities. In Senegal, the state does not have the same level of resources as it did in the past, but not all patronage is gone. State officials and local PS bosses continue to distribute some resources to rural citizens, but these are different from the favorable national-level policies of the past. Today, political patronage consists of sacks of rice, cloth with the candidate's picture on it, or access to small-scale development funds. Because national-level patronage has decreased, these local-level resources have increased in importance, a fact which has caused local marabouts to become more involved in electoral politics. Ndigals from local marabouts have begun to replace those of national marabouts. In 1993, several marabouts in the Diourbel region encouraged their followers to vote for the PS, while some even issued ndigals for Abdoulaye Wade. As was the case with the ndigal from the xalifa-general in 1988, the 1993 maraboutic appeals had little influence on vote choice among Mourides (Beck 1995). Mourides have become less obligated to the community, not because communal benefits do not exist, but because they have decreased.
The decline in Mouride support for the PS has not been so drastic that the party has lost control of government. Certainly not all Mourides have quit voting for the PS or refused to listen to the ndigals of their marabouts; many still honor their responsibilities to the community and feel that the state is meeting its obligations. But there are enough Mourides whose views of group obligations have been transformed that we can begin to speculate about their impact on politics. National elections have become more competitive in the last decade, in part because Mourides have abstained in higher rates or have voted for opposition parties. This fact can be seen in the gradual decline in PS support and voter turnout rates in Senegal. In 1988, the PS won 73.2 percent of the vote, but by 1993 the party's support had slipped to 58.4 percent (Villalón 1994a). National voter turnout rates have decreased from 64 percent in 1978, to 58 percent in 1988, to 51 percent in 1993 (Savane 1995; Villalón 1994a). The greatest decline in voter turnout has been in départements of the Diourbel region. In 1993, voter abstention in the Mouride-dominated Mbacké département (where Touba is located) dropped to 28 percent from 67 percent in 1988.24 The Bambey département, which is also in the Diourbel region and heavily Mouride, had the second lowest turnout rate in the nation with 37 percent (Savane 1995). These high abstention rates indicate that some Mourides have ignored the vote suggestions of their marabouts and re-evaluated their obligations to the community (Cruise O'Brien 1983; Savane 1995). The transformation of the role of Mourides in national elections provides one example of how changed views of responsibilities to the community may affect participation, even if that participation might continue to benefit the society.
The voting behavior and political attitudes of Patar residents reaffirm the changes in obligations to participate among Mourides. The majority of Patar inhabitants have been encouraged by their marabout to vote for presidential and legislative candidates from the PS (Male villager, 23 June 1995). In the past, the community was rewarded for its political support with state patronage--a new school building, a forage, a peanut storage building, and access to numerous projects funded by international donors (Male villager, 6 April 1995). The willingness of Patar villagers to follow their marabout and vote for the ruling party was predicated on the expectation that the community would benefit materially if villagers voted for the PS. Voting for the PS was seen as a responsibility of villagers, an act that would bring public goods to the community (Male villager, 23 June 1995; Male villager, 12 May 1995; Male villager, 5 June 1995).
Though in the 1990s Patar received less patronage support than in the past, the village was sporadically given state resources because of the marabout's lobbying. For example, in 1992 the marabout had intervened with officials at the Diourbel Water Department to get a needed part to fix the village forage (Male forage committee president, 4 July 1995). Even though there were benefits to gain, albeit on a smaller scale than in the past, some Patar citizens began to question their participation to achieve these communal goods. One man said, "It no longer matters whom we vote for. . . . Why throw away your vote on some suggestion by the marabout in return for nothing?" (Male villager, 13 April 1995). Another resident said, "Voting is just a waste of time. . . . Politicians say they will bring you something--rice for your family, a project for the village--but they never do. . . . If they do, they bring so little" (Female villager, 11 April 1995). These responses show that even if individuals have the right to access communal benefits, under some conditions they may be less willing to participate if they think the community has not met its obligations.
While many older people in Patar continued to follow the marabout's ndigals, two different trends had developed among male heads of households who were in their twenties and thirties.25 The school director estimated that approximately one-third of them no longer voted in elections, while another one-third had started to vote for candidates from opposition parties, especially the PDS (School director, 30 January 1995; Village chief, 6 April 1995; Male villager, 23 June 1995). One man admitted that the marabout, while he continued his pre-election visits to Patar to campaign for candidates, seemed less enthusiastic about encouraging villagers to participate (Male villager, 13 April 1995). The president of the women's group summed up the situation, "The marabout can come here and talk about duty and how our vote will make Senegal or the community better, but he might as well just be pissing in the wind" (Women's group president, 17 April 1995).
Communal participation by Mourides to achieve a larger public good has diminished in Patar, as it has throughout Senegal. While submission to the Mouride marabout among Patar inhabitants, or Senegalese in general, was never absolute, the power of the marabout to make suggestions in one area of his followers' lives--the political realm--seems to have decreased even more in the past decade. National marabouts appear to have realized this fact, while many local marabouts continue to try to mobilize their followers in election campaigns. Access to state benefits through local marabouts is still possible, but fewer Mourides vote as their marabouts desire in order to guarantee these public goods or meet communal obligations. Many Mourides have reinterpreted their role in the community because of changing circumstances which are outside the control of the tariqa. In doing so, they have by-passed opportunities to participate to achieve shared goods for the group.26
As was the case in the Ndoulo forage, the demise of the social contract and the decreased feeling of citizen obligations among Mourides were rooted in larger structural factors. SAPs that decreased spending on state agricultural programs meant that the state could not provide the marabouts and their followers with as many benefits as in the past. Economic challenges beyond the control of the marabouts or their followers (and some might argue, the Senegalese state) have led individuals to re-evaluate their responsibilities in this subnational group in light of what the group can provide. Patar citizens, as other Senegalese Mourides, still identify with the Mouride tariqa, feel a close relationship with their marabout, attend important Mouride events such as the Magal of Touba, and recite the stories and verses of Amadou Bamba (Villalón 1994b). As in other Mouride communities (Beck 1995), Patar Mourides are still relatively willing to listen to their religious leaders on personal issues (Village chief, 6 April 1995). They simply feel less responsibility to vote as their marabout suggests, because this holy man can no longer guarantee the community the same level of access to state resources as in the past. The Mouride case makes an interesting point--group identity may not translate into citizen obligations when the social contract in a common society has deteriorated.
Conclusion: The Implications of a Dynamic Citizenship
Based on the findings from the three case studies, it is possible to speculate about the dynamic nature of citizen rights and obligations and to suggest areas for future research. The cases illustrate that when people feel that their right to participate in an inclusive decision-making process has been undermined, they may feel few obligations to the community and not participate. The Ndoulo forage committee and Ndoulo GPF illustrated that decision making that does not incorporate compromise, consensus, or the input of everyone does not encourage involvement, even if that participation could lead to a public good on which all depend.Views of citizenship and participation may also relate to the ability of the community to give individuals access to the rewards of the social contract. When the rights of participants to access group benefits are dismissed, people may question their obligations to the society. When the community can no longer meet the expectations of participants, or is unable to meet those expectations to the same extent as it did in the past, individuals may re-evaluate how they participate in the public arena. They may question the reasons for meeting their obligations to the community, since the community either will not or cannot honor its part of the social contract. Such was the case in the Ndoulo GPF and forage.
The same situation existed among Mourides nationally and in Patar. Many Mouride voters believed that their marabouts could not provide access to as many state benefits as they had in the past. While it is true that Mourides never blindly followed their marabouts, their willingness to listen to the voting suggestions of the religious leaders has decreased even more in recent years. While following the ndigal of the marabout may bring the Mouride community some tangible (though small-scale) returns, individuals have re-evaluated the obligations of citizenship.
While the case studies only provide snapshots of three situations, they do enable us to see some initial patterns about how inclusive institutions, structural changes, and state involvement in so-called autonomous organizations can affect citizen rights and obligations. First, the institutions for making decisions impact how individuals view the balance of rights and responsibilities in a common society. The transparency of decision making and the accountability of leaders is more likely to encourage individuals to see their citizenship positively and to participate to achieve a common good. If institutions do not reflect the importance of input from members, people are less likely to feel loyalty to those institutions and the decisions that come from them. They question the need to responsibly participate in a group that ignores their rights of involvement. Citizenship and participation are not only about identities tied to group histories or experiences; they relate directly to the realization of rights and obligations.
Second, rights and responsibilities to participate in a society are rarely isolated from structural changes at the national or global level. In some African contexts, SAPs, which have been required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, shape how individuals view their role in relation to the national or local community. Macroeconomic factors influence the social contract between individuals and the public realm. They condition the choices that communities can make and the ways that individuals view their rights and obligations in those communities.
Third, even in small villages or rural associations, the state influences how individuals view their rights and obligations to the social contract. The involvement of state actors shapes decision-making processes, which over time wears down the obligations of individuals who are excluded. State policies, such as the rules for GPF registration in Senegal, create new requirements or structures which change the relations between leaders and followers, and transform the nature of obligations for all group members. Policy decisions such as cooptation of women's groups influence the resources that groups have for their members, and in turn, how their members view the subnational group. Even though the state is external to many communities, its interactions with those communities (or even just a minority of their members) lead to a reconfiguration of rights and obligations among members.
This point about state influences on citizenship raises a larger question about the resurgence of autonomous groups in rural Senegal. Much of the recent social science literature on Africa has argued that because the African state can no longer provide for its citizens, grassroots organizations have emerged to fill this void (Tripp 1994; Chazan 1988). Women's groups, village councils, and local development organizations are assumed to be autonomous from state control, a fact which enables them to challenge the state and to effectively design programs to meet their members' needs (Azarya 1988; Clark 1990). However, the case studies presented here question the level of autonomy of such organizations. Informal state regulations or ties of friendship between leaders and state officials can decrease the autonomy of village groups.
In Senegal, informal state control over so-called autonomous groups appears prevalent not only with the GPFs and forage committees, but also with officially-recognized economic development organizations (groupement d'intêret economique--GIE). As local organizations compete for access to capital, land, and patronage, they may be forced to build ties to state actors. For example, many international donors rely on state officials for recommendations of village groups which could benefit from externally funded projects. Local associations without ties to state actors miss out on such external resources, because they have no state official to recommend them (Development official in Dakar, 30 June 1995). Further, local organizations that need trade permits or land access approval must interact with state officials, a fact which necessitates their relinquishing some control over group policies and programs. While the state in Senegal has become less able to overtly control local groups, it continues to have an indirect influence on village associations. This situation limits the effectiveness of groups and shapes the ways their members view rights and responsibilities.
Future research is needed to determine if these conclusions about citizenship and participation are applicable in contexts other than rural Senegal. While it is likely that exclusive decision-making processes, manipulative state leaders and policies, and decreased participation by community members because of disappointment with the ways a community meets its obligations affect citizenship in other venues, more studies are needed to clarify and further test these findings. Scholars should also examine additional variables that shape how individuals see their rights and responsibilities within a community. Such studies could address the influence of democratic transitions and multiparty elections on citizen obligations, the ways that devolution of government power shapes notions of responsibilities at the local level, and the impact of external influences such as donor aid or NGO-organized projects on the mutual obligations between a particular community and its members.
Notes
1 I am grateful for insightful comments from Jean Abshire, York Bradshaw, C.R.D. Halisi, Angelique Haugerud, Paul Kaiser, Stephen Ndegwa, Zeric Kay Smith, and several anonymous reviewers. Funding for the field research for this article was provided by Indiana University Graduate School and the West African Research Association.
2 I do acknowledge, though, that purposeful noninvolvement can also be considered an act of participation, if it is intended to influence decision makers and reflects the rights and responsibilities of individuals in the community.
3 It is estimated that over 90 percent of the total Senegalese population is Muslim. In 1960, Mourides composed 18 percent of Muslims; by 1985, they were approximately 50 percent and were most numerous in the Diourbel region (Creevey 1985; Villalon 1995:71, 98).
4 I conducted in-depth interviews with over 150 individuals in Ndoulo and over seventy individuals in Patar. Interviewees were representative of different economic and educational levels, ethnic groups, age groups, and genders. Additionally, I interviewed all community leaders in each village. All interviewees were assured that they would remain anonymous in all publications.
5 Class is a difficult concept to define in rural Africa because of the incomplete nature of capitalist development. However, differences between people based on income, education, and ties to state resources are apparent even in rural communities (Sklar 1979).
6 These officials included the sub-prefect (sous-préfet), the Head of the Rural Expansion Center (chef du CER), and officials at the Water Department in Diourbel. The sous-préfet is the administrative officer at the arrondissement level who oversees tax collection and land use and implements state regulations. The chef du CER allocates development funds and is in charge of the Rural Expansion Center team (Centre d'Expansion Rurale--CER), a group of government specialists in the areas of sanitation, agricultural development, women's development, and forestry management who work and live in the arrondissement capitals of Senegal. An arrondissement is an area of administration that contains approximately 100 villages.
7 The following information came from my observations of the forage community meeting held on 17 March 1995 in Ndoulo. Interviews conducted after the meeting with committee members and villagers were used to supplement the observations.
8 These individuals' other choice would have been to disengage from involvement with the forage committee.
9 It seemed logical to have at least one woman on the redressment committee, since women were the village group most affected by problems with the forage. If the forage did not work, women had to walk to nearby villages to pull water and then carry it home. Even one male committee member admitted, "If the women ran the forage, they would make sure it never broke down" (Male forage committee member, 13 June 1995).
10 This information is from observations of forage and redressment committee meetings held in Ndoulo and attended by the author on 26 March 1995, 8 April 1995, 5 May 1995, 6 June 1995, and 8 July 1995. Interviews with members confirmed these observations.
11 Six hundred of Ndoulo's approximately 1,700 residents were adults. Ndoulo had approximately 300 households, each composed of an average of two adults and four children (Sous-préfet, 8 June 1994).
12 These price increases did not include the aforementioned proposed increase of March 1995.
13 22,000 CFA is roughly $44, using the 1995 exchange rate of 500 CFA/$1.
14 The monitrice (or female instructor) works on women's development projects within the arrondissement and is under the direction of the chef du CER.
15 The population contained within the territory of the Diourbel dèpartement is approximately 150,000 and there are over 400 villages in the area (Ministère de l'Economie 1993: 18).
16 The chef du CER explained that the group could not hold elections because all village GPFs in Senegal were being reorganized and local elections would be disruptive to this process. However, this argument seemed a bit inconsistent since GPFs in several surrounding villages elected new leaders in 1995 (Chef du CER, 22 February 1995). The chef du CER also maintained that one women's development group per village should be sufficient (Chef du CER, 3 December 1994). The monitrice explained that state policy forbade the village from having more than one GPF, but that women could organize more traditional groups if they desired (Monitrice, 18 May 1995).
17 The following information came from my observations of the GPF meeting held on 19 May 1995 in Ndoulo, Senegal, and from follow-up interviews of participants.
18 1,500 CFA is roughly $3. Both interviewees who discussed this project spoke favorably of it. While they would have liked to have received more money for themselves, they realized the importance of reinvesting in future projects. They both reiterated that the majority of group members made the decision to reinvest part of the profits.
19 I focus on Patar instead of Ndoulo for the study of rural Mourides because all Patar residents identify themselves as Mourides, while only half of Ndoulo inhabitants do (Patar village chief, 13 April 1995).
20 In Senegal, there are numerous individuals who call themselves marabouts or shaykh (sëriñ in Wolof). They serve as patrons to their followers, providing them with spiritual guidance and at times, material assistance. Donal B. Cruise O'Brien (1971) estimated that there were over 300 marabouts in Senegal. In the Mouride tariqa, anyone who has followers and knows the wird, or special prayer formula which was attributed to Amadou Bamba, may be called a marabout. Many of these are rural individuals, who live with their followers and have very close relations with them. All Mourides also follow the xalifa-general, who has his headquarters in Touba, supervises all Mouride collective enterprises, and is a direct descendant of Amadou Bamba. In Patar, villagers have a personal relationship with Aliou Mbacké of Touba, though they give their ultimate allegiance to the Mouride xalifa-general.
21 The PS has gone through several name changes, from the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese People's Bloc--BPS) in 1956, to the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (Senegalese Progressive Union--UPS) in 1958, to the PS in 1976.
22 While maraboutic control is not absolute, the adoration of followers is evident. When marabouts visit rural villages, they are welcomed warmly and treated with honor. In a display of devotion, all Mouride followers in Patar who were physically able attended the yearly field clearing for their marabout near Touba in May 1995.
23 While the end of agricultural programs has hurt peasants, it is less clear that the marabouts have been as financially devastated as their followers. Mohamed Mbodji (1991: 125) argues that the marabouts have "experienced a serious drop in income and a reduction in their prestige." On the other hand, today not all Mouride marabouts are tied to agriculture as they were a decade ago. Many have become more involved in urban and international trade and have not been harmed by the end of state agricultural programs (Cruise O'Brien 1988: 139-143; Villalón 1995: 69).
24 No doubt, some of this decrease in turnout is because of the 1993 Senegalese electoral code which tried to curb electoral fraud through the use of indelible ink, better procedures for counting ballots, and mandatory use of the secret ballot.
25 Though there was a generational difference in voting trends among Patar's Mouride voters, I do not have evidence that this pattern existed nationally. The PDS has relied on younger voters but a clear pattern of generational split among Senegalese is unclear (See also Villalón 1994a.)
26 In some cases, voter abstention can reflect notions of communal obligations. When abstention is organized and purposeful, it can convey a message from the community and reflect the responsibilities that individuals feel toward the community. However, in the case of the Mourides, voter abstention has not appeared to be aimed at larger objectives and has not reflected ideas of duty to the group.
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