from Africa Today Volume 48, Number 3Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid
Jonathan Crush and David A. McDonald
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Apartheid-era immigration laws remain in force in South Africa. The will to change is considerable but the whole transformation process has been constantly bedeviled by the complexity of the issues and political tensions between the ruling ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party.
The Aliens Control Act of 1991 was one of the final pieces of legislation to emerge from the crumbling ruins of apartheid. The Act itself consolidated five existing pieces of legislation into a single omnibus law governing the terms and conditions of entry of noncitizens into the country. This legislation, rooted in the imperatives and ideology of late apartheid, has proven to be a blunt, ineffectual and often unconstitutional instrument for migration management in postapartheid South Africa (Crush 1998).
Seven years after the historic 1994 elections, however, "apartheid's final act" remains in place. There can be few areas, land policy excepting, where the apartheid legacy has seemed so deeply entrenched and so difficult to transcend (Cousins 1999). One reason for the glacial rate of progress toward a new postapartheid immigration regime might simply be that immigration is a contentious issue. Yet far more controversial legislation has been formulated and enacted by the government in a fraction of the time. Nor can it be that the slow pace is because of an unprecedented process of public consultation (Buthelezi 2001). Consultations can be conducted in short order and there is not a great deal of evidence that this particular consultative process has shaped the new legislation in significant ways.
This is not to diminish the importance of a lively public discussion that has taken place over the future direction of South African immigration policy since 1994. At various times the debate has pitted party against party, department against department, state against civil society, human rights advocates and the courts against the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), and Parliament and Cabinet against the Minister. Such a public process would have been inconceivable under apartheid. But true movement away from the apartheid immigration system has been slow to follow.
Because of the protracted nature of the interregnum, South African immigration policy is still (in late 2001) governed by legal and regulatory mechanisms inherited from the old regime. Two central questions therefore arise in attempting to evaluate this period: first, why has it taken so long for government to formulate and implement a new postapartheid immigration policy; and second, what have been the consequences of persisting with an old regulatory machine designed by the apartheid state. The essays in this volume aim to provide detailed answers to these two questions. They are anchored in several years of close monitoring of, and direct participation in, the process that has shaped the struggle for a new policy.1
By way of background to the papers that follow, this introduction focuses on the continuities and discontinuities in immigration policy on either side of 1994. The essay first highlights the four inherited pillars of apartheid migration policy. It then examines the contradictory and at times conflicting response of the postapartheid state to this inheritance. While certain breaks with this past need to be underscored, there have also been notable continuities in the way in which migration is viewed and policed by the state. The final section of this introduction reviews the emergence of a new policy framework in 2001 and speculates on whether the proposed new framework will truly ring down the curtain on apartheid's final act.
Apartheid's Bequest
South Africa's twentieth-century immigration policies under white minority rule rested on four pillars: racist policy and legislation; the exploitation of migrant labor from neighboring countries; tough enforcement legislation; and the repudiation of international refugee conventions.
With regard, firstly, to immigration policy, successive white governments used racial and religious criteria to decide who would be allowed access to the country and on what terms (Peberdy 1999). Periods of isolationism (in which all immigrants were viewed as a threat) alternated with periods of selective immigration (when whites from Europe were actively courted). By the 1980s, virtually anyone with a white skin was welcome. All potential immigrants had, by law, to be "assimilable" by the white population. Immigrants of color were unwelcome, and, in particular, Africans from elsewhere on the continent. The overt racial selection of immigrants was only abandoned in the dying years of apartheid when the state allowed in selected black skilled immigrants and "honorary whites" from Asia to bolster apartheid's pernicious "homelands" strategy of co-optation.
The second key pillar of apartheid immigration policy was the migrant labor system to the mining and commercial farming sectors from neighboring countries (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman 1991; Crush and James 1995). The system was underwritten by bilateral treaties which worked in favor of employers and governments and solidly against the interests of migrants and their dependents. These treaties are highly anachronistic and knowledge of their contents is poor in policy circles (Crush and Tshitereke, in this issue). The treaties themselves were licensed by an exemption clause in immigration legislation, thus producing a "two-gates" policy (one for white immigrants, another for black migrant workers). Not one of the thousands of migrant workers from neighboring countries who spent (and often lost) their lives on South Africa's mines and farms ever qualified for permanent residence in the country. The contract labor system ensured that migrants would return home at the end of each contract and at the end of their working days. This system, often dubbed a cornerstone of apartheid, survived intact into the 1990s.
Alongside the formal migrant labor system, South Africa had a lengthy history of receiving migrants informally from neighboring countries. The country's borders were extremely porous and before the 1960s there were no border posts at all between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Many migrants did not qualify for the organized trade in cheap contract labor. They went to South Africa of their own volition and performed vital work in the factories, farms, and white homes of apartheid. The state was ambiguous in its response to irregular migration, sometimes turning a blind eye and sometimes dragooning migrants to work in labor-starved sectors. Increasingly draconian measures of arrest and deportation were adopted in the 1980s as all outsiders came to be seen as a threat by a hysterical state.
The third migration pillar was apartheid's draconian enforcement apparatus. Fashioned on the notorious pass laws and influx controls, the state attempted to police the country's external boundaries with minimal due process. In 1991, the Aliens Control Act introduced tough new penalties for unauthorized migration to South Africa (a thinly disguised state assault on forced migrants from war-ravaged Mozambique). The Act also gave sweeping new powers of entry, search, and arrest to immigration officers and the police. Maximum penalties for "harboring" an "illegal alien" increased to five years' imprisonment. Police immediately launched nationwide raids on informal settlements (Operation Sentry) and began to arrest and deport Mozambican refugees living in the cities. Brutal tactics reminiscent of the pre-1986 pass laws era came to the fore. In 1991, some 47,000 Mozambicans were arrested and deported, a figure that continued to rise through the early 1990s (Minnaar and Hough 1996).
The dying apartheid state poured significant new resources into policing immigration and the refugee influx. In 1993, the government established an Inter-Departmental Committee on Illegal Aliens to coordinate a national control plan. That same year, the South African Police Services (SAPS) established a national Aliens Investigation Unit to investigate and prosecute smugglers and harborers. In early 1994, the SAPS further intensified its ground-level campaign against unauthorized migration. The number of internal tracing units dedicated to identifying and arresting migrants increased from three to fourteen. The three existing units (dubbed Maputo Squads by the police) were based in Nelspruit, Johannesburg and Welkom. By the time of the 1994 election, the squads were operating in most major cities. In the run-up to the election, monthly deportations reached an all-time high.
The fourth central pillar of apartheid's migration regime was the cynical refusal to develop a refugee policy. The National Party government rejected both the United Nations (UN) and OAU refugee conventions. Asylum-seekers who washed up on South African shores were treated as "illegal aliens" under the ACA. In the 1980s, South Africa's military destabilization of the Southern African region produced a mass movement from Mozambique to neighboring countries (Hanlon 1986). Over 300,000 desperate refugees trekked into South Africa. The refugees were welcomed by local people along the eastern border where they were allowed to stay by the government provided that they did not leave the area. By the 1990s, despite their precarious legal position, many had been thoroughly integrated into local communities and showed little inclination to return to the shattered Mozambican countryside.
Reconfigured Boundaries
None of the essential elements of the apartheid bequest were consistent with the constitutional and human rights emphasis of the new dispensation. Despite the noted failure of the postapartheid Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to address the immigration issue, most observers expected the rapid emergence of a new policy framework (ANC 1994; Government of South Africa 1996). This expectation was heightened by the 1996 Presidential Commission to Investigate Labour Market Policy which made far-reaching proposals to reform the inherited immigration system (DOL 1996: 165–90). All of these proposals were stillborn. The ambiguous response of the post-1994 government to the dubious apartheid inheritance is symptomatic of the tensions and contradictions that have riven the formulation and development of a postapartheid immigration policy.
Postapartheid immigration policy has made three important breaks with the past. First, with regard to immigrant selection, the postapartheid state has clearly abandoned the racist immigration policies of its predecessors. But rather than replacing that policy with a more universal selection system, there has been little appetite for immigration at all. The declared task of the new state was to redistribute the cake to newly enfranchised citizens, not allow others in to take an undeserved slice. Decision makers showed minimal support for immigration, a view widely endorsed at the grassroots (McDonald 2000). Immigration to South Africa which had seen 60,000 new arrivals per annum in the 1960s had declined as apartheid disintegrated. The decline continued from 14,500 immigrants in 1990 to 6,400 in 1994 and to less than 4,000 in 1999.
To argue that the new government has been actively hostile to immigration would be an overstatement. Benign indifference would be a better description. There is little evidence that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) saw any role for immigration in its social and economic transformation plans. Even the growing acceptance of neoliberal economic doctrine and the scurry for foreign capital did not produce any shift in thinking about the potential value of immigration. Only in 2001, in response to perceptions of a massive brain drain and the entreaties of the private sector, has the ANC suddenly declared a new policy direction, an aggressive international hunt for skilled immigrants (McDonald and Crush 2001).
With regard to the regulatory framework of control, the first impulse of the ANC was to offer one-off compensation to the victims of apartheid immigration policies (Crush and Williams 1999). Over the head of the Minister and Department of Home Affairs, Cabinet approved three immigration amnesties for noncitizens in 1995–96. The first came at the request of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Miners who had worked on contract in South Africa for at least ten years were offered permanent residence. About half of those who were eligible actually applied. The NUM had unsuccessfully pushed for a five-year exemption and the miners' amnesty did little for retrenched or injured miners who had been sent home. Nevertheless, the amnesty was a generous offer to compensate a few for the past sufferings of all. The offer also provided an opt-out of the migrant labor system, but few accepted it for that reason (SAMP 1997, 1998).
In 1996, Cabinet approved a second legalization amnesty, this time for citizens of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) who could offer proof of residence (legal or illegal) in South Africa for at least five years. There were major problems in the implementation of this amnesty but 201,602 people eventually applied of whom 124,073 (sixty-two percent) were accepted as new South Africans (Crush and Williams 1999). By choosing 1991 as the cutoff date, Cabinet made it clear that those who had entered clandestinely after that date would be treated very differently.
The third amnesty was announced in 1997 but not implemented until late 2000 for resource and logistical reasons. The target population was Mozambican refugees who had fled to South Africa before 1992 and stayed thereafter. This population has spent the best part of a decade dodging the deportation squads. Latest reports suggest that 230,000 Mozambicans have applied for legal permanent residence in South Africa under this amnesty (Johnston 2001).
Unlike its predecessor, the postapartheid state was committed to the ideals and practice of international refugee protection. Once South Africa became a signatory to the UN and OAU refugee conventions in 1995, it was duty-bound to put a refugee protection system in place (de la Hunt 1998). This was made more urgent by the fact that South Africa had become a new destination for asylum-seekers from elsewhere on the continent. These asylum-seekers were being manhandled by the ACA which was never intended to offer protection to anyone (Handmaker, de la Hunt and Klaaren 2001). The passage of a new Refugee Act in 1998 was therefore a landmark event. The implementation of this legislation has taken much longer but the vigilance of the non-governmental and international human rights communities and the courts has kept the state relatively honest (Handmaker, in this issue). South Africa still lacks a sound and robust refugee determination system, however. In its absence, there is strong residual suspicion among South Africans that most asylum-seekers are economic migrants in masquerade.
The Aliens Control Act is so obviously a product of its apartheid-era engineers and at odds with the rights-based emphasis of a new democratic and constitutional order that its longevity will always be something of a blot on the record of the postapartheid government. In 1995, the Minister of Home Affairs persuaded Parliament that the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was, in fact, too soft. Above the protests of NGO's and human rights groups, Parliament sanctioned various amendments which gave the Department new powers and abilities to police in-migration. The full extent of the violations of the rights of noncitizens and citizens enabled by the ACA has been extensively documented elsewhere (HRW 1998; SAHRC 1999). The enforcement authorities have consistently maintained that their duty is to uphold the law and that until the law changes they can hardly be blamed for enforcing it.
Postapartheid South Africa, echoing destination countries worldwide, justifies draconian enforcement in terms of the "threat" posed to citizens by "waves" and "floods" of immigrants from an impoverished Africa (McDonald 2000; Danso and McDonald, in this issue). But has there, in fact, been a massive increase in undocumented migration to South Africa since 1994? Officials and the media reckon the numbers in the millions. Official figures claim that there are up to nine million unauthorized migrants in the country. A critical examination of such figures shows a fallacious methodology devised by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 1995. Statistics South Africa has put the number at around 500,000 which seems a little closer to the mark (Crush 1999a).
In the first year of democratic governance in South Africa, deportations of undocumented migrants increased by seventy-five percent. In 1995, South Africa deported a record 157,084 people. Of these, eighty-four percent were from neighboring Mozambique and many were ex-refugees (Minnaar and Hough 1996). The police began to report arrests of migrants in their "crime statistics" giving impressive weight to their claims about combating crime. Between 1994 and 2000, over 600,000 people were forcibly removed from the country by the police. The police and the army have played major roles in enforcement with little more than administrative oversight from the Department of Home Affairs. Policing has focused on (largely ineffectual) border control backed up by intrusive and extensive internal military-style policing. Corruption is an institutional feature of the system and numerous human rights abuses occur in the arrest and detention of undocumented migrants and refugees (HRW 1998). The view of many commentators is that the tactics used by police since 1994 are "dramatically similar" to apartheid policing practices (Klaaren and Ramji, in this issue).
The vast majority of migrants are popularly seen as "illegal aliens" fleeing an Africa in chaos. Some are accepted as genuine asylum-seekers but the vast majority of claimants are deemed bogus. Legal immigrants are perceived to deprive locals of jobs and services while "illegal immigrants" supposedly corrupt officials, cause crime and grab scarce resources from South Africa's poor. Such views permeate the media and reverberate in the streets (SAMP 1999). Those who expected or hoped for a new openness and level of tolerance in the aftermath of the 1994 election have been rudely disappointed. Research shows a pervasively high and deepening level of hostility and intolerance toward outsiders, and particularly Africans from elsewhere (McDonald 2000; SAMP 2001; Crush and McDonald 2001). The key question is whether these stereotypical claims are based on sound evidence. The research suggests that they are not: official numbers of unauthorized migrants are grossly inflated; migrants are victims more than perpetrators of crime; migrants and immigrants often expand the size of the pie; and most have no intention of remaining permanently in South Africa (McDonald 2000).
Another major continuity with the apartheid period is that the contract migrant labor system from neighboring countries remains firmly in place. Although downsizing and retrenchments have cut the overall size of the mine workforce in half over the last decade, foreign labor continues to be prized. The mines still recruit migrant labor unrestricted from outside the country. The proportion of foreign labor in the mine workforce rose from forty percent at the beginning of the decade to nearly fifty-five percent by the end. The contract labor system has also been extended to incorporate women migrants (SAMP 2000). Commercial vegetable farms in the Free State employ increasing numbers of female migrants from Lesotho. In Mpumalanga and Northern Province, commercial farmers also hire seasonal contract workers from Mozambique and Zimbabwe (SAMP 2000). Legally, the system continues to be underwritten by outdated bilateral treaties signed in the 1960s and 1970s (Crush and Tshitereke, in this issue). Even the compulsory deferred pay system, a form of payment for foreign workers in which monies are remitted to their home countries, remains in place. As before, contract miners and farmworkers can acquire no rights of residence in South Africa.
A primary feature of apartheid-era immigration legislation and practice was its gendered character. Immigrants were explicitly conceived as white and male. Females were seen as the dependent spouses and children that accompanied the economically productive male and as a potential drain on the state and its citizens (Peberdy 1999). The migrant labor system was also explicitly gendered. The primary South African employers of migrants wanted male workers and that is what the system supplied. Wives, partners and dependents were prohibited from accompanying their spouses to South Africa and became, in academic parlance, "the women left behind" (Dodson 2000). That designation meant nothing to women who migrated of their own accord often illegally and always to jobs at the bottom end of the labor market. While there is no longer any explicit gender bias in immigration and migration legislation, the ACA can certainly not be considered gender neutral in its effects. In addition, a gender dimension has been notably absent from official documents (such as the Green and White papers) and the vigorous public debate on new policy (Dodson, in this issue).
The final continuity with the past concerns the way in which South Africa positions itself in relation to the region and the subcontinent. For apartheid ideologues, Africa was a place of "otherness," of danger and threat. The threat to white supremacy posed by the independence struggles in other countries, as well as the material support given to South Africa's liberation movements, produced a siege mentality that foolishly imagined that the country could erect a security perimeter to insulate it from the north. Resources were poured into border controls and border fences were electrified to lethal voltages. Although the current was turned off, the idea of Africa as a threat has proven to be extraordinarily hard to shake in postapartheid South Africa (SAMP 2001). Many of the same apartheid-era images and stereotypes have simply been displaced onto African immigrants and refugees, known pejoratively as kwerekewere. One of the political casualties of this mentality has been progress on a regional approach to migration management. In contrast to SADC Protocols fostering regional free trade and educational exchange, South Africa (in alliance with Botswana and Namibia) killed two Protocols on freer movement (Oucho and Crush, in this issue). There is little prospect of their resurrection in the near future.
In sum, there has been considerable continuity in the immigration policies and practices bequeathed by apartheid. Certainly, when the ANC has intervened (as in the three legalization amnesties) it has demonstrably tried to distance the state from the past. But these were historical correctives, not forward-looking ideas about the role of immigration and migration in the new South Africa. By and large, immigration and migration have been viewed to date as antithetical (or at best irrelevant) to the postapartheid project of nationbuilding and social transformation.
Explaining the Impasse
The primary distinguishing feature of South African immigration policy during the period from 1994 to 2001 has been the emphasis on control and exclusion, a policy for which the Aliens Control Act was specifically designed and is well suited. In that sense, there have been considerable continuities with the apartheid period and some disturbing parallels with its practices.
Three contrasting hypotheses have been advanced to explain this situation. The first accepts the doomsday immigration scenario of the Department of Home Affairs at face value (Minnaar and Hough 1996, Solomon 1996). There is a crisis and the state must act decisively to deal with it. As noted earlier, this position is not borne out by research which shows that the numbers have been exaggerated, the impact overstated and the positive aspects of migration minimized.
A second line of argument points to the significance of the appointment of the leader of the conservative Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to the senior Home Affairs portfolio in 1994 (Crush 1999b). That, in turn, produced an untransformed bureaucracy and diminished ANC influence over policymaking. Certainly the Minister's views on immigration have never been officially endorsed by the ANC government. Thus, it is suggested, progressive immigration reform was ultimately held hostage to the broader politics of IFP appeasement. The fate of the progressive Green Paper on International Migration, written by an independent task team in 1997, is a case in point. The Green Paper was widely welcomed by senior figures in the ANC, the Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs and key constituents such as Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the other unions. Yet Buthelezi found its positive vision sharply at odds with his public and private demands for an exclusivist and draconian approach to migration and immigration. The ANC backed off and, from that moment, the migration policy reform process became increasingly bogged down. For the ANC, it is argued, this was a small price to pay for ending the carnage in Kwazulu-Natal.
A third general line of argument rejects the implied distinction between the ANC and IFP with regard to immigration policy during this period. In other words, the ANC did not come out against the main thrust of an IFP-directed immigration policy because it had no fundamental disagreement with it (Peberdy 1999). This is an uncomfortable argument, perhaps, which could easily have been allayed by a stated ANC policy position on immigration. Even the ANC's apparent conversion in early 2001 to a skills-based immigration policy echoes a similar conversion by the Minister two years earlier. Given the very different histories and policy positions of the ANC and IFP, the argument is perhaps too stark as it stands. Clearly, there have been significant differences of opinion with the Minister within the ANC. But these voices have not been heard by the public, perhaps for the reason suggested by the second hypothesis. More interesting in this context are efforts to situate the convergence within a more general analysis of nation building and postapartheid identity (re)formation (Croucher 1998, Reitzes 2000).
A recent study of the history of South African immigration policy shows that the first impulse of new governments has consistently been to articulate a new vision of national identity and, simultaneously, to redefine the racial and cultural boundaries of belonging and exclusion (Peberdy 1999). This process was accompanied by a highly restrictionist immigration discourse and policy after 1910, 1948, 1963, and again after 1994. In the last decade, South Africa has embarked upon its first truly democratic and racially inclusive nation-building project. But that very process has involved the reconfiguration and redefinition of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Skepticism grew about the value of immigration. Hostility toward immigrants followed. This has been sustained and advanced by a powerful anti-immigrationist discourse which constructs outsiders (particularly Africans) as alien and a fundamental threat to the interests of citizens (Peberdy, in this issue).
New Legislative Moves
In June 1996, the South African Minister of Home Affairs publicly defended the Aliens Control Act as providing a "sound legal base for effective alien control." The amended Act was in line with international practices of "more stringent control." He noted further that the success of the Department's intensified law enforcement and control measures depended on the cooperation of all political parties and tiers of government: "the future of our country and children depends on us in this regard" was the melodramatic conclusion. Home Affairs officials appearing before the Presidential Labour Market Commission in 1996 defended the Aliens Control Act and said they saw no need for new immigration legislation. The Commission, appointed by the Minister of Labour, thoroughly disagreed but its recommendations on migration (which would have required the assent of Home Affairs) were ignored.
The Draft Green Paper on International Migration called in 1997 for separate refugee and immigration legislation, a new national skills-based immigration policy, regional sensibility, and rights-regarding enforcement. Even as the Green Paper team was sitting, senior white bureaucrats in the Department of Home Affairs submitted a chilling parallel memorandum to Cabinet asserting that any future government White Paper should "boldly declare war on illegal immigration characterizing it as one of the country's major social and economic plagues" and calling for draconian policing measures.
Only in the refugee area was there immediate progress. South Africa had Convention obligations to honor and a growing number of asylum-seekers. A refugee task team was appointed with solid representation and expertise from the nongovernmental sector. The task team moved expeditiously and drafted South Africa's first ever refugee protection legislation. The new Refugee Act was passed in 1998. While the legislation constituted a retreat from the bold policy positions of the Draft Green Paper, it was still sufficiently progressive to warrant praise from all parties (Barutciski 1998, Handmaker, de la Hunt and Klaaren 2001). Ironically, as some predicted, it was the most regressive aspects of the Act that the Department tried hardest to implement. These strategies have been vigorously, and successfully, contested in the courts by human rights groups.
While good progress was made with refugee policy, immigration reform stalled. After much uncertainty and prevarication, the Minister appointed a White Paper Task Team dominated by Home Affairs bureaucrats. The team held poorly attended public hearings in major cities and then set about the task of writing a White Paper. The White Paper proved to be a deeply contradictory document, on the one hand reflecting the Department's ongoing obsession with the "illegal alien" problem; on the other, proposing mechanisms for a new and more open skills-based immigration policy (as the Draft Green Paper had earlier advocated).
Legislation to give effect to the White Paper was drafted almost immediately and put into the public domain by early 1999. A public conference designed to endorse the Bill was convened in Parliament in July 2000. Vigorous criticism of the Bill from migration experts, business, labor, and human rights organizations produced few amendments. The Bill then went forward to Cabinet where months of controversy followed as the ANC was finally forced to declare its hand. After ditching the Bill's proposals for a U.S.-style Immigration Service, the ANC Cabinet hastily produced a policy framework on immigration.
In 1997, the call of the founding Draft Green Paper on International Migration was for a new Immigration Act to replace the Aliens Control Act. The Bill tabled in Parliament in 2001 departs from many of the principles and particulars of the ACA. Certainly the new Immigration Act promises a long-overdue new approach to immigration, with skills being the main criteria for immigrant selection. What has happened, it appears, is that the ANC government under Mbeki has become a late convert to the argument that the country is in the midst of a skills crisis and that massive immigration is the only remedy. What the proposed legislation implies for the other aspects of the apartheid inheritance is much less clear. Contract migration from the region is set to continue for as long as the mines want it. And there remain great concerns in the human rights community about the proposals for policing immigration. The urgency of passage to a new regulatory framework is as acute now as it was in 1994. Whether the Bill, in the spirit of 1994, truly lays a platform for a new beginning is very doubtful.2 The essays that follow provide important insights into why this might be, why transformation away from the apartheid migration legacy has been so slow and what the consequences have been for policy, for migrants and for citizens themselves.
Acknowledgments
The editors wish to thank the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for its support of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and the research reported in this special issue.
NOTES
1. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The Project acted as an official adviser to the South African government's International Migration Task Team in 1996–97. In 1998, the South African Director of SAMP served on the White Paper Task Team. SAMP has made several policy submissions to the Department of Home Affairs and has worked closely with the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee. The majority of authors in this special issue either belong to organizations that are part of the SAMP regional research network or have undertaken contract work for SAMP. For further details about SAMP and its activities, see the project website at: www.queensu.ca/samp.
2. See the SAMP analysis at: www.queensu.ca/samp/ImmigrationBillComments/SAMP.htm.
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